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The Three Faces of ORPP: Value Clashes in the Law
Richard K. Greenstein'

INTRODUCTION

A. The Williams Case
On September 12, 1968, William Joseph Tabafunda, age seventeen months,
died of complications resulting from an untreated abscessed tooth. His mother
and stepfather were convicted of manslaughter.
The Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Williams described the
defendants as follows:
The defendant husband, Walter Williams, is a 24-year old [sic] fullblooded Sheshont Indian with a sixth-grade education. His sole
occupation is that of laborer. The defendant wife, Bernice Williams, is
a 20-year-old part Indian with an 11th grade education. At the time of
the marriage, the wife had two children, the younger of whom was a
14-month son. Both parents worked and the children were cared for by
the 85-year-old mother of the defendant husband. The defendant
husband assumed parental responsibility with the defendant wife to
provide clothing, care and medical attention for the child. Both
defendants possessed a great deal of love and affection for the
defendant wife's young son.'
That son, William, fell ill on September 1, 1968, and died eleven days later
because an abscessed tooth had been allowed to develop into an
infection of the mouth and cheeks, eventually becoming gangrenous.
This condition, accompanied by the child's inability to eat, brought
about malnutrition, lowering the child's resistance and eventually
producing pneumonia, causing the death....
...The evidence showed that in the critical period [of William's
illness] the baby was fussy; that he could not keep his food down; and
that a cheek started swelling up. The swelling went up and down, but
did not disappear. In that same period, the cheek turned "a bluish color
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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like." The defendants, not realizing that the baby was as ill as it was
or that the baby was in danger of dying, attempted to provide some
relief to the baby by giving the baby aspirin during the critical period
and continued to do so until the night before the baby died. The
defendants thought the swelling would go down and were waiting for
it to do so; and defendant husband testified, that from what he had
heard, neither doctors nor dentists pull out a tooth "when it's all swollen
up like that." There was an additional explanation for not calling a
doctor given by each defendant. Defendant husband testified that "the
way the cheek looked, *** and that stuff on his hair, they would think
we were neglecting him and take him away from us and not give him
back." Defendant wife testified that the defendants were "waiting for
the swelling to go down," and also that they were afraid to take the
child to a doctor for fear that the doctor would report them to the
welfare department, who, in turn, would take the child away. "It's just
that I was so scared of losing him." They testified that they had heard
that the defendant husband's cousin lost a child that way. The evidence
showed that the defendants did not understand the significance or
seriousness of the baby's symptoms. However, there is no evidence
that the defendants were physically or financially unable to obtain a
doctor, or that they did not know an available doctor, or that the
symptoms did not continue to be a matter of concern during the critical
period. Indeed, the evidence shows that in April 1968 defendant
husband had taken the child to a doctor for medical attention.2
In affirming the manslaughter convictions, the court of appeals concluded
that
there is sufficient evidence from which the [trial] court could find, as
it necessarily did, that applying the standard of ordinary caution, i.e., the
caution exercisable by a man of reasonable prudence under the same or
similar conditions, defendants were sufficiently put on notice concerning
the symptoms of the baby's illness and lack of improvement in the
baby's apparent condition ... to have required them to have obtained
medical care for the child. The failure so to do in this case is ordinary
or simple negligence, and such negligence is sufficient to support a
conviction of statutory manslaughter. 3
B. Law, Valve Clashes, and Moral Visions
We define ourselves by the choices we make. We define ourselves morally
by the moral choices we make. The same holds true for communities.

2.
3.

Id. at 1173-74.
Id. at 1174.
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A community defines its moral self, in large part, through the decisions of
its public institutions, including its courts.4 Each legal case presents the court
with an occasion to identify and apply the appropriate legal doctrine, which
means to identify and apply the relevant social values; for legal doctrine
expresses society's values.
The decisions of courts are particularly interesting because they unite two
distinct dimensions of social values. On the one hand, judicial decisions form
part of the web of social norms that structure the behavior of community
members in their public and private relationships.' On the other hand, judicial
decisions define the conditions under which the community will use its collective
coercive power against particular members. 6
The law of criminal negligence applied in the Williams case 7 illustrates this
duality. The normative principles of criminal negligence doctrine together with
sundry customary, religious, and ethical norms, define our communal expectations concerning the extent to which each person must regulate his or her
conduct with regard to the well-being of others. In Williams, the specific issue
was the care owed in the parenting of William Joseph Tabafunda. At the same
time, criminal negligence doctrine identifies the specific circumstances that
justify the use of the state's coercive power to punish those who carelessly harm
8
others.

4. To some extent, the values of society will be reflected in social customs and conventions.
But a heterogeneous society will have heterogeneous customs, notwithstanding the possible
dominance of the customs of one particular group.
The specific decisions of public institutions represent (in a stable society) the authoritative
pronouncements of social values. They are authoritative in the sense that the community recognizes
the legitimacy of the institution's power and the consequent legitimacy of its procedurally proper
decisions, even when individuals and groups within the society disagree with the substance of specific
decisions. Moreover, since, in a heterogeneous society, there can be no set of decisions that
accurately reflects the "will of the people," the decisions of institutions stand as the only explicitly
authoritative identification and application of social values. See generally. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social
Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963).
5. See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 26-48 (1961).
6. See generally Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight trans. 1967); Hans Kelsen,
General Theory of Law and State (Editorial Committee of the Ass'n of Am. Law Schools ed. &
Anders Wedberg trans. 1945).
7. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1169-70 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
8. This distinction corresponds roughly to the contrast between doing the right thing and
having a right. Law is part of a more comprehensive collection of standards that define how one
ought to act, but law is tautologically the exclusive source of definition regarding what one has a
legal right to do.
Sometimes the law addresses both of these concerns. Thus, the law of criminal negligence both
holds that one generally ought to exercise due care in one's behavior toward others and generally
authorizes the use of coercive power to punish someone who has carelessly injured another. In other
words, the law that announces a duty of care simultaneously creates a similar corresponding right.
Sometimes, however, legal fights do not perfectly correspond to right conduct. Under tort law, for
instance, a negligent person may avoid having to pay compensation for injuries caused, in part, by
his carelessness because of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Another example is the
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In Parts One and Two of this Article, I will illustrate and explore these two
normative dimensions of law-law as a partial source of direction for how we
ought to behave and law as the exclusive source of direction for how government
can force us to behave. My focus for this part of the discussion will be a
ubiquitous legal construct that appears in civil 9 and criminal' ° as well as
public" and private"2 law: the Ordinary, Reasonable, and Prudent Person
(ORPP).
ORPP functions as a standard for evaluating the behavior of individuals like
Walter and Bernice Williams. In Part One, I will demonstrate that the ORPP is
not one standard, but three. Moreover, I will show that these three faces of
ORPP reflect three distinct and irreconcilable moral visions regarding personal
responsibility and corresponding liability for harm.
But, again, law also defines the conditions for the state's exercise of
coercive force. How can the law use for that purpose a doctrine that expresses
multiple, irreconcilable values? On the one hand, the law could limit a priori
the meaning of ORPP to just one of its three possible meanings and apply that
single understanding of ORPP to all cases. On the other hand, the application
of ORPP could require each decision-maker to select ad hoc which of the three
meanings to use; thus, each case would become an occasion not just for applying
society's values to the facts at hand, but for choosing among competing values
and corresponding moral visions.
These two approaches to resolving the value conflict inherent within
ORPP-the a priori and the ad hoc--correspond to significantly divergent
understandings of legal reasoning and decision-making. My intention in Part
Two is to examine these two approaches and to tease out the theoretical
significance of each.
Finally, in Part Three I will attempt to use these theoretical considerations
to understand the four common components of legal reasoning: classifying a
problem doctrinally; articulating the doctrinal rules, tests, principles, policies,
etc., to be applied; determining the degree of abstraction with which to apply
doctrine; and comparing the facts of the case with those of doctrinal precedents.' 3 With respect to these phases of analysis, the courts have used each of
the two approaches-the a priori and the ad hoc-with predictably different
consequences.

First Amendment protection given to expressions of racial prejudice. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916, 99 S. Ct. 291 (1978).
9. See sources cited in Ronald K.L. Collins, Language. History and the Legal Process: A
Profile of the "Reasonable Man," 8 Rut.-Cam. L.J. 311, 313 nn.6 (bailments). 8 (contracts). 10
(trusts), 12 (torts) (1977).
10. See sources cited in id. at n.9.
11.
See, e.g., 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 686, at 572 (1962).
12. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
13. These components are, of course, not discrete in practice but instead interlock and overlap.
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PART ONE

The ordinary, reasonable, and prudent person 4 is commonly described as
"abstract," "hypothetical," and "mythical."'"
In one famous account, A. P.
6
ideal."'
"an
as
ORPP
described
Herbert
These descriptions are misleading because they suggest that ORPP does not
have real-world qualities, but is instead an imaginary figure who lives by a
standard unattainable to the actual individuals who make up society. In short,
ORPP is "a fictitious person, who never has existed on
under such description,
7
land or sea."'
But as John Stuart Mill argued over a century ago, hunan beings do not
think in abstractions apart from their real experiences.' 8 Whatever characteristics we give to ORPP must be characteristics that we have observed in the world.
We observe behavior that we regard as prudent and then "abstract" from that
behavior the particular characteristics that we associate with its prudence. We
construct ORPP out of those characteristics. The issue, then, is the source of
ORPP's characteristics. 9
This issue has been debated largely in terms of subjective versus objective
models of ORPP. It might be expressed more helpfully in terms of external
versus internal standards; that is, the extent to which ORPP's characteristics are
those possessed by someone other than (external to) the actor whose conduct is
being evaluated. Legal doctrine employs three distinct models for ORPP, each
of which resolves that issue differently.
In the first model, ORPP's intelligence, skill, knowledge, and values are
defined by the qualities possessed by some other person. Often this other person
is the decision-maker--or perhaps more accurately, the aspirational person that
the decision-maker would like to be, based on the observed prudent conduct of

14. For this particular formulation, see, e.g., Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124,
126 (Utah 1982); Ryder v. Murphy, 124 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Mich. 1963). ORPP has many aliases.
E.g., Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 916 (Minn. 1980) ("person of ordinary prudence"); Trentacost
v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 440 (N.J. 1980) ("reasonably prudent person"); Massey v. Scripter, 258
N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 1977) ("reasonably careful person"); Collins v. Altamaha Elec. Membership
Corp., 260 S.E.2d 540, 541-42 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) ("ordinarily cautious and prudent person"). For
a general sampling, see W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 32, at 174
nn.5-8 and accompanying text (5th ed. 1984).
15. Keeton etal., supra note 14, at 175.
16. A.P. Herbert. Misleading Cases in the Common Law 8-15 (6th ed. 1931).
17. Keeton et al., supra note 14, at 174.
18. See H.L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Utilitarian Jurisprudence 117-24
(1984). The metaphysical antecedent to Mill's psychology on this point is nominalism, which denies
that abstractions have any independent referent.
19. For a discussion of modem cognitive theory concerning the relationship between experience
and concepts, see Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor ofStanding and the Problem of Self Governance,
40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1384-86 (1988).
20. See, e.g., Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 Harv. L. Rev. I
(1927).
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others. 2' Sometimes (particularly when the conduct in question has an expert
or esoteric dimension) this other person is an aspirational figure with the qualities
of highly qualified practitioners in the actor's field.22 Reasonableness and
prudence are, accordingly, defined in terms of how the decision-maker would
expect this aspirational figure (either the decision-maker's aspirational self or the
aspirational ideal in the actor's field) to act.
In the second model, ORPP possesses the intelligence, skill, knowledge, and
values of the actor. Reasonable and prudent actions are then defined in terms
of how the decision-maker expects someone possessing the actor's qualities to
act.
These two models represent distinct moral standards for judging an
individual's conduct. The first model represents a teleological moral view. The
ideal conduct of the aspirational figure of ORPP provides a concrete standard for
notions such as duty, fault, responsibility, and blameworthiness. The conduct of
real people is thus evaluated in terms of how closely it follows the aspirational
standard.
The second model--centered as it is on an individualized figure of
ORPP-represents an emphasis on the will of the person being scrutinized. In
this model, notions like responsibility and blameworthiness are functions of the
malice with which the individual acts, in light of that individual's unique
configuration of characteristics. Negligence, specifically, is defined in this model
as the failure to act with the degree of carefulness that can be expected from this
kind of person.23
Put another way, the first model treats the issue of reasonable care in a
relatively abstract fashion; we define the category in which the individual falls
(i.e., we compare the individual to others in "the same or similar circumstances")
and then judge the individual in terms of an "objective," external standard
applicable to all persons in that category. By contrast, in the second model, we
judge the individual in light of what we can reasonably expect from this person
with this unique set of abilities and limitations.2 4

21. At the same time, it is important to emphasize the aspirational quality of ORPP. It is not
proper for the jury to judge a party by what they would do under like circumstances. See Keeton et
al., supra note 14, at 175 n.lI and accompanying text.
22. For example, a discussion of the application of the standard to the conduct of physicians
can be found in id. at 185-93.
23. For a discussion of negligence as a culpable state of mind, see H.L.A. Hart, Negligence,
Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, in H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in
the Philosophy of Law 136 (1968).
24. This contrast might be compared usefully to the two modes of moral reasoning identified
in the works of Carol Gilligan. E.g., Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (1982); Carol Gilligan &
Grant Wiggins, The Origins of Morality in Early Childhood Relationships, in The Emergence of
Morality in Young Children 277 (Jerome Kagen & Sharon Lamb eds. 1987). The first approach,
which submerges individual characteristics by placing the person within a more abstract category.
corresponds to Gilligan's "morality of justice." The second approach, which attends to the
individual's unique characteristics, corresponds to the "morality of care."
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There is, however, a third model for ORPP. The first two models are
designed to determine fault. Thus, model number one measures fault in terms
of the distance by which the actor's conduct falls short of the aspirational
standard. Model number two measures fault in terms of the maliciousness of the
actor's will-i.e., the actor's failure, in light of his or her particular abilities and
limitations, to behave with proper regard for the well-being of others.
The core of the third model is not fault, but harm. The goal is to prevent
or provide compensation for harm to innocent victims of dangerous activities.
This model defines unreasonable conduct as that which creates an unacceptable
level of danger, i.e., an unacceptable risk of harm. Under this model, ORPP
represents the person who would not engage in such unreasonably risky activity.
ORPP, thus, serves as a heuristic device for identifying behavior that the
community (through its representative, the decision-maker) considers unacceptably dangerous.
This view, which received its most powerful expression in the academic and
judicial writings of Holmes,2" employs a thoroughly objective and external
standard. 6 The individual characteristics of the actor are irrelevant because the
issue is the dangerousness of the activity.
The radical nature of this standard can be seen in the treatment of mental
retardation. Under the first model, a substantially retarded person will generally
not be liable for negligent harm. This is so because the very notion of
evaluating conduct by an aspirational standard is inapposite when the actor is
physiologically incapable of meeting (and thus of sensibly aspiring toward) such
a standard.27 Under the second model, the actor's conduct will be evaluated in
terms of what is reasonably expected of a person with the actor's level of
retardation. The conclusion will obviously vary from case to case.2" But
mental retardation is altogether irrelevant under the third model. If liability is
a function of the objective dangerousness of the activity, then the state of mind
or capacity of a person engaging in that activity does not matter, and a retarded
person is just as liable for harm caused as an individual possessing normal
mental ability.29
As with the first two models of ORPP, this one expresses a particular moral
vision: an essentially utilitarian concern with minimizing harm to the community
and its members. Like classical utilitarianism, the methodological principles are

25. Oliver W. Holmes, The Common Law 108 (1923); cf.Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass,
165, 171-176 (1884) (interpreting the standard for criminal recklessness). See generally Pohlman,
supra note 18, at 136-39.
26. See, e.g., New England Tractor Trailer Training, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480 N.E.2d
1005 (Mass. 1985) (negligent defamation); Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
cert. denied, 309 So. 2d 7 (1975) (wrongful death).
27. See, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
28. See, e.g., Soledad v. Lara, 762 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988): Young v. Grant. 290
So. 2d 706, 710 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974).
29. See, e.g., Wright v. Tate, 156 S.E.2d 562, 565 (Va. 1967).
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"scientific." The dangerousness of an act (unlike aspirational ideals or subjective
will) is subject to scientific examination. The community determines the
dangerous tendencies of the actor's conduct and then judges whether the level
of dangerousness is acceptable. 0
On the other hand, it is arguable that the vision animating this third model
of ORPP is not properly a moral one at all since it effectively dispenses with
traditional moral notions like fault and blameworthiness. Instead, by making
liability a function of the dangerousness of the act, the standard veers inevitably
toward a series of strict or absolute liability rules attached to specific types of
conduct.3
The tension among these three models is illustrated in the Williams case.
Negligence is defined as "the caution exercisable by a man of reasonable
prudence under the same or similar conditions."32 The definition, itself,
suggests a merger of the models. The phrase "man of reasonable prudence"
suggests a standard external to the actor (models one and three),33 whereas the
phrase "under the same or similar conditions" seems to refer the decision-maker
to the specific world of the actor (model two). Not surprisingly, the court's
analysis navigates among judgments about defendants' failure to exercise
"ordinary caution" (model one), expressions of understanding (even sympathy)
for defendants' misapprehension of the circumstances (model two), and
manifestations of horror at the consequences of defendants' inaction (model
three).

When we say that people should act "reasonably," what do we mean? One
thing that we have in mind is a way of behaving that is conducive to the
common good and, ultimately, to the flourishing of each individual within the
community. To act reasonably is to live up to that standard.
Another thing that we mean is that each of us should, to the best of his or
her ability, avoid injury to others. To act with inattention to or disregard for the
well-being of others is to act unreasonably.
We also mean that certain kinds of conduct present unreasonable risks of
harm to others. To engage in such conduct is to act unreasonably, and one does
so at one's peril.

30. See Pohlman, supra note 18, at 136-39.
31.
See, e.g., Buda v. State, 97 N.Y.S.2d 37, 49-54, 198 Misc. 165, 177-83 (Ct. Cl. 1950),
aftid, 278 A. D. 424, 105 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1951). See generally Pohlman, supra note 18, at 44-45.
32. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); cf Model Penal Code §
2.02(2)(d) (Official Draft 1962).
33. For a discussion of the gender-specific implications of the use of the word "man'" in the
traditional formulations, see Collins, supra note 9.
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But now what? If ORPP has not one personality, but three, how should we
decide cases in which the figure of ORPP is invoked? The question is one of
great practical significance since law defines the conditions for the use of
society's collective power. Will the community's coercive force be mobilized
on behalf of plaintiff or defendant in civil litigation, on behalf of the government
or the accused in a criminal case? When the answer turns on a determination of
how an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent person will act, then it turns on the
model of ORPP that is chosen.
Sometimes it will not matter which model is used. If I drive down a
narrow, residential street at seventy miles-per-hour because it amuses me to do
so and injure a pedestrian in the process, I will no doubt be found to have acted
unreasonably and imprudently no matter how ORPP is described.
But for Walter and Bernice Williams, the particular model used was highly
significant. The Washington Court of Appeals appears to have applied the first
model, and the Williams' conduct was measured by how people like the judges
(with their education and experience) would ideally have behaved. Not
surprisingly, the parents' behavior was deemed culpable. But had a different
question been asked, had the issue been how people with the cultural, educational, and experiential background of the Williams could reasonably be expected to
act under the particular circumstances-then the death of William Joseph
Tabafunda might well have appeared as a tragic accident.
PART Two

The three personalities of ORPP express these three different ways of understanding what it is to act like an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent person. In
easy cases (I drive seventy miles-per-hour for fun), the three models of
ORPP-with their three distinct visions of how we should act toward one
another-lead to the same decision. But in hard cases (the inadequate care given
by the Williams), different models will lead to different outcomes.3
And so we need to know something more. It is not enough in Williams to
ask whether defendants acted as would persons of ordinary and reasonable
prudence. We must know which model of ORPP should be used.
The precise issue I wish to explore here is this: When do we decide which
model of ORPP to use in a particular case? Two options are apparent. We can
make a general decision to use one particular model and then apply that in the
future to each specific case, 35 or we can make a new choice from among the
36
three models each time we decide a specific case.

34. For a discussion in the context of personal jurisdiction of how the multiple and
irreconcilable values of legal doctrine operate in easy and hard cases, see Richard K. Greenstein, The
Nature of Legal Argument: The PersonalJurisdiction Paradigm, 38 Hast. L.J. 855 (1987).
35. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 cmts. b-c (1965).
36. See Model Penal Code § 2.02 (2)(d) (Official Draft 1962); Model Penal Code and
Commentaries, cmt. to § 2.02 at 242 (1985).
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The question can be posed another way. The three faces of ORPP present
three distinct moral perspectives and, hence, three distinct clusters of norms
structuring our relations with one another. Each of these value clusters is
advocated by members of society. Is it the function of legal doctrine to elevate
one of these moral perspectives to a position of preeminence in the resolution of
our disputes (the a prioriapproach)? Or is it the function of legal doctrine to
reveal and illuminate the tension among these perspectives and then leave the
choice of values to the decision-maker in each case (the ad hoc approach)?
The a priori approach. prefers one model of ORPP and the values it
represents, as a general matter, in all cases where the different values associated
with ORPP clash. Thus, for instance, an appellate court might declare that
mental retardation is never a defense to liability for harm caused by objectively
dangerous behavior (ORPP model three).37 This approach is characterized by
a tendency to formulate legal doctrine in terms of "black letter" rules or "tests"
that can be broken down into specific steps. These are then applied in an
apparently deductive fashion to 'the facts of specific cases.
An effect of the approach is to expand the universe of functionally easy
cases by prejudging and thereby obscuring the clash of values that makes cases
difficult. This expansion inflates the scope and significance of stare decisis and
consequently promotes values such as order, certainty, predictability, and
uniformity. Moreover, since the traditional notion of legal rights depends upon
the idea of preexisting legal norms that determine specific results in specific
cases, the expansion of the number of easy cases both advances and is justified
by the ideology of rights. 8
But the most obvious account for the a prioriapproach is the perception by
the court of something approaching a societal consensus on a particular ordering
of values. For example, a court might well perceive a societal consensus that
manufacturers ought to be strictly liable for injuries caused by their products,
notwithstanding the concomitant denigration of values having to do with fault.

37. Cf Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1961) (defendant was chronic-schizophrenic).
See generally Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 189 (1973). An interesting, but distinct, variation on this problem
is presented when the choice among competing values is made by the legislature. See, e.g., Cal. Civ.
Code § 41 (Deering 1989) (insanity not a defense to suit for compensatory damages). The focus of
this Article, however, is on courts, which, unlike legislatures, can choose between making such
choices generally or making them anew in each particular case.
38. For a powerful defense of the relationship between the determinacy of legal rules and
principles and the grounding of legal rights, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in Ronald Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously 81 (1977). See generally Ronald D\'orkin, Law's Empire (1986). A
substantial body of recent literature has attacked this classical liberal vision of law. See, e.g., Robert
W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, it The Politics of Law 413 (David Kairys ed., 2d
ed. 1990); Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L.J.
1 (1984); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1984). One response to this
critique has been to search for a conception of legal rights that does not depend upon legal
determinacy. See, e.g., Frank i. Michaelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a
Contradictory World, in 28 NOMOS 71 (Pennock & Chapman eds., 1986); Martha Minow,
Interpreting Rights: Ali Essay for Robert Cover, 96 Yale L.J. 1860 (1987).
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This perception, in turn, would support the announcement by the court of a
general rule of strict liability applicable in all such situations.
When such a consensus exists,3 9 an argument for efficiency supports a
general, a prioriapproach to hard cases. Why rehash the competing values in
each case when the existence' of consensus virtually guarantees that the same
ranking of those values will always be reached? That guarantee flows both from
the decision-maker's own membership in society (and consequent likelihood to
share the consensus view) and from the potential institutional damage to the
court if a decision inconsistent with the consensus were reached.
A consensus of a different type might also justify the a prioriapproach. As
noted above, this approach serves the values of order, certainty, predictability,
and uniformity. A consensus may exist in the community that these values are
significantly more important than any of the specific values involved in the
doctrinal dispute. The "mailbox rule" in contract law illustrates this situation.
There are arguments, both generally and in specific cases, for either making
acceptance of an offer effective when dispatched or when received. The rule
dating from 181840 that an acceptance is effective upon dispatch has been
strongly criticized. 4 But the continued acceptance of that rule 42-notwithstanding the criticism-may well reflect an overriding community concern for
predictability: the importance of knowing in advance the point in time at which
a legally binding agreement has been reached. This concern requires that the
court formulate a rule-any rule-and apply it uniformly, rather than determine
in each individual case the most appropriate time for effective acceptance.
Conversely, the absence of any such social consensus creates an obvious
argument against the a priori approach. As Kenneth J. Arrow effectively
demonstrated, a public institution cannot through a series of specific decisions
reflect public values when a division on the issue exists. 43 As a result, the
fixed ranking of the multiple values buried within legal doctrine represents a kind
of normative imperialism-the imposition on all members of society of the value
preferences of the judge or, perhaps, of the majority.
By contrast, the ad hoc approach recognizes the relevance of multiple,
distinct values to the particular issue. Most essentially, the approach recognizes
that these distinct values are incommensurable and, hence, not susceptible to an
objective ranking. Therefore, when distinct values clash, as they do in hard
cases, the result is a dilemma.

39. Of course, a court might erroneously perceive a nonexistent consensus. Accurately
determining the community's values is an institutional problem for courts, which lack many of the
investigatory tools available to the political branches.
40. Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818).
41. See, e.g., Malcolm P. Sharp, Reflections on Contract, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 211, 213-15
(1965); Ian R. Macneil, Time ofAcceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 947 (1964).
42. E.g.. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63 (1981).
43. See Arrow, supra note 4.
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Hard cases involving ORPP present a dilemma in this sense. The
contrasting values represented by the three models of ORPP clash in difficult
cases like Williams. Nonetheless, a choice among principles must be made, for
the practical point of legal analysis is to determine how the coercive power of
the court should be used in the particular case. Thus, under the ad hoc approach,
the decision-maker must still choose to give priority to one set of values over the
others in the instant case.
This means that the choice, being ad hoc, is provisional. In the next hard
case involving a clash of the same values, the decision-maker (whether the same
or a different person) could order the values differently. Each hard case,
therefore, presents another occasion for the community's representatives to reflect
upon clashing values and the need to order them to resolve the dispute. Since
the order chosen on behalf of the community defines the society's moral
priorities, the ad hoc approach to hard cases generates an ongoing community
debate on fundamental issues regarding the public and private relationships of its
members. And because the community's debate about its most basic values has
a history as old as the community itself, the ad hoc approach represents a way
of participating in a dialogue with the past."
Needless to say, the ad hoc approach, in contrast to the a priori approach,
tends to contract the range of functionally easy cases and consequently the range
of substantive legal rights. Instead, the parties in hard cases are entitled merely
to a conscientious consideration of the competing values prior to the rendering
of a decision. 45 As a further result, the ad hoc approach reduces the scope of
stare decisis resulting in the impairment of predictability, certainty, and
uniformity.
However, as a practical matter the ad hoc approach does not dramatically
undermine the law's stability. Because courts are hierarchically and pyramidally
arranged, relatively few judges have the power to regulate these ad hoc
preferences. Since these decisions reflect the judges' visions about what kind of
society this should be and since in the short term those visions will be consistent
and coherent, the decisions (again, in the short term) will tend to reveal a
consistent and coherent pattern. What must be understood, however, is that this
pattern is not imposed by principle, but by the imaginative visions of judges.
For this reason, decisions under the ad hoc approach are both provisional and
46
stable.

44. This idea that the legal analysis of hard cases proceeds as a discourse that binds the
community together receives powerful voice in the works of Martha Minow. See, e.g., Minow, supra
38, at 1873-75. See also Dennis Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76
Va. L. Rev. 937, 986-87 (1990).
45. See Greenstein, supra note 34, at 885.
46. A good illustration is the doctrine relating to the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the context of criminal investigations, interpretations of the
amendment are suffused with the tension between privacy values and "law and order" concerns.
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PART THREE

The issue of whether the multiple values that are relevant to a particular
doctrinal question should be ranked in the abstract for future application (the a
prioriapproach) or in the context of each particular case (the ad hoc approach)
is not addressed by the case law in the philosophical terms of the preceding part.
Rather, it plays itself out in the practical stages of legal analysis: determining
the doctrinal category in which the case belongs, articulating the specific legal
doctrine (the rules, principles, tests, policies, etc.) applicable to the case,
determining the degree of abstraction with which the doctrine will be applied,
and applying the doctrine by comparing the case sub judice to precedential cases.
We tend to think of these stages of legal reasoning in primarily instrumental
terms. For instance, a lawyer 7 preparing arguments on behalf of a client
categorizes issues, defines doctrine, employs levels of abstraction, and analogizes
and distinguishes precedents in ways that will justify a particular outcome.48
But however instrumental these activities are, they collectively express a moral
vision. How one goes about legal reasoning implicitly reflects an attitude toward
the multiplicity of values encapsulated in legal doctrine. Because these stages
of legal reasoning apply in all areas of law, I will explore them in the following
three sections using examples drawn from public and private law and from
doctrines generated from common law, legislation, and constitutional provisions.
Again, the stages are: classification of the problem, articulation of the
relevant doctrine, determination of the level of abstraction on which the doctrine
will be discussed, and application of the doctrine through a series of analogies
and distinctions. Although the characterization and classification of a legal
problem is typically the first step in legal analysis, I will defer consideration of
this categorization process until the broader discussion of analogy and distinction
(to which it is closely related) in Section C.
Section A, then, addresses the second stage: how the doctrine relevant to
a particular dispute is articulated. Specifically, the question is whether to express

Over the long term (i.e;, since the late 1950's) this tension has produced great volatility in Supreme
Court decisions on the subject. In the short term, coherent visions have characterized the rulings.
Thus, the Court in the 1960's and 1970's revealed aconsistent preference for privacy, while decisions
in the 1980's and 1990's have reflected a shift toward a concern for social order. A recent example
is the doctrinal shift regarding the scope of permissible warrantless searches of automobiles.
Compare Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586 (1979) and United States v.Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977) with California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982 (1991) and United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
47. Perhaps judges do this also. The classic statement of the instrumental use of legal
reasoning by judges seeking to justify a particular result is Joseph C. Hutcheson. Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274 (1929).
48. Plausible arguments on different sides of a particular question are possible only in hard
cases. In easy cases, the values at stake all point to a particular conclusion. Consequently, no
persuasive argument supporting adifferent result is possible. See Greenstein, supra note 34, at 87582.
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doctrine as a rule or test to be applied to the problem at hand or as competing
policies or interests to be balanced.
Section B is concerned with how doctrine can be understood at various
levels of abstraction. Sometimes it is applied at a highly abstract and hypothetical level. Alternatively, it may be applied in very specific, contextual terms. I
will use examples to illustrate both the mechanics and important consequences
of this choice.
The discussion in Section C centers on analogical reasoning. In particular,
two phenomena related to analogical reasoning will be scrutinized: the tendency
of precedent to vary in force in different areas of the law and the problem posed
by every case of categorizing legal issues for analytical purposes.
In each of these explorations, I will suggest that the way jn which particular
methodological questions are resolved reflects an attitude toward doctrinal value
conflicts. I will seek to relate these attitudes to the a priori and ad hoc
approaches discussed above.
A. Articulation of Doctrine
There are two very different ways of talking about the legal doctrine
applicable to a particular case. Doctrine can be expressed in terms of "blackletter rules" and multi-part "tests" to be applied to a given set of facts in an
apparently deductive fashion. Or doctrine can be expressed in terms of
competing "policies" or "interests" that must be "weighed" and "balanced" in the
context of the particular dispute.4 9 The choice between these two ways of
describing doctrine has interesting and crucially important consequences.
I will illustrate this choice with three examples drawn from different areas
of law. The first example comes from constitutional law.
1. Northern Pipeline and the Powers of Legislative Courts
Part of the controversy over so-called "legislative courts"50 concerns the
propriety of giving such courts authority over matters normally handled by courts
established under Article III of the Constitution-i.e., courts presided over by
judges with life-tenure and protected salaries."3 In Northern PipelineConstruc-

49. The distinction that I am making in this section should not be confused with a different
distinction that has been proposed between hard-edged "rules" and murky "standards," Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976), which
Carol Rose has recast as the distinction between "crystals" and "mud." Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 577 (1988). However, an analysis of the rule-standard
distinction raises issues similar to those addressed here. See Kathleen M. Sullivan. Forward: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 24 (1992).
50. Legislative courts are congressionally created adjudicatory bodies, presided over by judges
lacking the protected tenure and/or compensation guaranteed to Article III
judges. See generally
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543-52, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 1469-73 (1962).

51.

U.S. Const. art. Ill, § i:
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tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,52 the Supreme Court confronted the issue
of whether a bankruptcy court could adjudicate state-law claims related to a
pending bankruptcy action. The Court's decision comprises three opinions. Of
interest here are the plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan,53 and Justice
White's dissent, 4 joined by two other members of the Court.
' What is especially striking about these two opinions is the extent to which
the seven justices agreed. Between the plurality and the dissent, the following
points were undisputed: that the bankruptcy court was not an Article III court
since bankruptcy judges lacked both life-tenure and protected salary; that statelaw claims, such as those at issue in this case, were matters falling within the
"judicial power of the United States," as defined by Article III; that Article III
seems literally to require that matters falling within the "judicial power" be
handled by Article III courts; and that the basic principle behind this requirement
was the separation of powers (i.e., a measure of protection-through protected
salary and tenure-from intimidation by Congress or the President in connection
with issues coming before the federal courts). Moreover, the plurality and
dissenters all recognized the existence of well-known historical instances in
which the Court-notwithstanding the literal language of Article Ill-allowed
Article III business to be handled by non-Article III bodies. And they
understood these exceptions to exist in situations in which separation of powers
is either not a problem or is adequately addressed despite the allocation of
Article III business to a non-Article III body.
Yet the plurality and dissenters disagreed fundamentally over the proper
approach to applying all this shared understanding to the instant case. Justice
Brennan's opinion articulated the applicable doctrine in terms of a specific rule
with specific exceptions.55 The rule was that Article III business should not be
given to a non-Article III body. Four exceptions were identified: (1) adjudicatory bodies in geographic areas over which the Constitution gives Congress plenary
governing power (i.e., territories and the District of Columbia), (2) military
courts (courts-martial), (3) bodies adjudicating cases involving "public rights,"
and (4) bodies that act as "adjuncts" to Article III courts. When the plurality
laid this template over the instant case, it found that the adjudication of state-law
claims in a bankruptcy context fell into none of the exceptions; thus, the general

The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
52. 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
53. Id. at 50, 102 S. Ct. at 2858.
54. Id. at 92, 102 S. Ct. at 2882.
55. Id. at 63-87, 102 S. Ct. at 2867-80.
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rule applied, and the bankruptcy
court lacked the constitutional power to
56
adjudicate the state-law claims.
Justice White's approach was to identify the values that generated the
plurality's rule and its exception in the first place. The values turned out to be
precisely those that define the broader principle of separation of powers. On the
one hand, Congress needs the maneuvering room necessary to carry out its
constitutionally delegated authority. Sometimes the most efficient and effective
way to do this involves creating quasi-judicial bodies that lack Article III
protections. On the other hand, the judiciary needs the Article III protections as
a defense against intimidation by the other branches of government-including
Congress-with respect to matters before the federal courts. 7
The plurality's strict "rule-plus-exceptions" approach tilted in favor of
Article III courts and would carry that bias into every case raising this particular
doctrinal issue. By contrast, Justice White regarded the competing interests of
Congress and the judiciary to be equal and entitled to equal consideration in each
case. His solution was thus to weigh the interests in the particular situation and
decide which prevailed.
In Justice White's assessment, Congress' interest in effectively carrying out
its Article I bankruptcy responsibilities was a strong one. By contrast, the threat
to judicial integrity was minimal. (What interest did the President or Congress
have regarding the adjudication of these state-law claims?) Moreover, the
dissenters judged that the statutory provisions for appellate review of bankruptcy
cases by Article III district courts provided Article III protection adequate for the
specific situation. Consequently, they concluded that the weighing that favored
the four historical exceptions identified by the plurality also
favored the
58
expansive powers of the bankruptcy courts in the instant case.
2. Will Formalities and Decedents' Intent
My second example of the tension between rules and underlying values
concerns determining the validity of wills. The values underlying this area of
private law fall primarily into two categories. On the one hand, the doctrine is
concerned with identifying and carrying out the intentions of the decedent.59
On the other hand, the volume and potential complexity of will construction
6
argue in favor of rules governing will validation that serve administrative ease. 0

56. Id. at 70-72, 76, 87, 102 S. Ct. at 2870-72, 2874, 2880.
57. Id. at 113-16, 102 S. Ct. at 2893-95.
58. Id. at 116-18, 102 S. Ct. at 2894-96.
59. E.g., John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act. 88 Harv. L. Rev. 489.
491 (1975).
60. Id. at 493-94.
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Will "formalities," derived from the English Statute of Wills 6' and Statute
of Frauds,62 mediate these concerns. The formalities typically require that the
will be in writing, that it be signed by the testator, and that it be signed by
witnesses. Formalities facilitate the carrying out of donative intent through their
ritualistic, evidentiary, and protective functions. At the same time, formalities
facilitate administrative ease and uniformity by molding the expression of the
testator's intent into a standard form.63
But the formalities tilt in favor of the latter concerns. That is to say, there
are cases in which .the strict and technical enforcement of formalities serve
administrative convenience and defeat donative intent, but none in which the
opposite occurs. Two New York cases illustrate this "problem." In each case,
a husband and wife simultaneously executed individual wills, but inadvertently
signed the will drafted for the other. In each case, the inadvertence-and thus
the intention of each individual to dispose of the relevant estate according to the
instrument signed by the other-was clear.
In In re Cutler's Will,' the court found that the decedent did not intend to
dispose of her property according to the will she signed and had not signed the
will that was prepared for her. But although the court clearly understood that
Cutler intended to dispose of her estate in accordance with the will which was
inadvertently signed by her husband, her failure to comply with formalities-to
sign the proper will-meant that she had no valid will. 65 In other words, the
court refused to distribute Cutler's estate according to her intent, when that intent
could only be determined by evidence extrinsic to a "properly" signed will.
In re Snide66 addressed the same issue with different results. A closely
divided court (four to three) permitted the receipt of extrinsic evidence to show
the actual intent of the decedent to sign the will signed by his wife, which was
identical to the one he actually signed. The court held that no benefit flowing
from the strict enforcement of formalities (including, presumably, administrative
ease and uniformity) outweighed the carrying out of decedent's intent under the
particularfacts of this case:
[T]his is a very unusual case.... Not only did the two instruments
constitute reciprocal elements of a unified testamentary plan, they both
were executed with statutory formality, including the same attesting
witnesses, at a contemporaneous execution ceremony.... [T]he refusal
to read these wills together would serve merely to unnecessarily expand
formalism, without any corresponding benefit. On these narrow facts
67
we decline this unjust course.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Wills Act, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1.
Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3.
Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 Ind. L.J. 155, 159-60 (1988-89).
58 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
Id. at 604.
418 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 658.
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The dissenters in Snide predictably cited Cutler, among other cases, in
support of the strict enforcement of the statute of wills: "It is never sufficient
under our law that the decedent's wishes be clearly established; our statute, like
those of most other common-law jurisdictions, mandates with but a few specific
exceptions that the wishes of the decedent be memorialized with prescribed
formality.""
The dissenters, moreover, understood that the strict application of the
formalities furthered order, predictability, certainty, and uniformity. They saw
clearly that the majority's abandonment of a precise rule in favor of a contextual,
ad hoc, balancing approach threatened descent down a slippery slope and
expressed this anxiety in familiar, in terrorem language:
I fear an inability to contain the logical consequences of this decision
in the future. Thus, why should the result be any different where,
although the two wills are markedly different in content, it is equally
clear that there has been an erroneous contemporaneous cross-signing
by the would-be testators, or where the scrivener has prepared several
drafts for a single client and it is established beyond all doubt that the
wrong draft has been mistakenly signed? Nor need imagination stop
there. 69

3. The Rules of Decision Act
The final example of these contrasting approaches to describing doctrine
involves procedural law, specifically vertical choice-of-law. Vertical choice
problems raise the question whether federal or state law will supply the relevant
doctrine on a particular issue. The basic federal statute governing vertical choice
problems is section 1652 of the Judicial Code, the so-called Rules of Decision
Act, which provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treatises of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
70
United States, in cases where they apply."
Since this statute requires the use of state law only with respect to "rules of
decision," the meaning of that phrase has become a central interpretive issue,
especially in the context of diversity cases. The Supreme Court has, during the
past half-century, employed two distinct approaches to the definition of a rule of
decision.
One approach, first articulated in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 7 held that
in diversity cases "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be

68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. (Jones, J., dissenting).
Id. at 659 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464 (1945).

1993]

THREE FACES OF ORPP

substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
as it would be if tried in a State court. ' 2
In York, the issue was whether a federal equity court hearing a diversity
action must apply the relevant state statute of limitations. Since the statute was
"outcome determinative" (application of the statute would require dismissal of
the action), the statute was a "rule of decision," and the federal court was thus
obligated to apply it.
The York outcome-determination rule was subsequently modified in the dicta
of Hanna v. Plumer73 to make clear that the rule was to be understood in light
of the "twin aims" of the Rules of Decision Act, as interpreted by the Court in
the case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins:74 "discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 75 Accordingly, the question of outcome-determination must be viewed from the
perspective of a party at the outset of the litigation. Would a departure by the
federal courts from state law affect the choice of forum and unfairly discriminate
against parties in nondiverse actions who consequently lacked access to federal
courts?
The famous contrast to the York-Hanna approach occurred in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.76 In that case the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a particular factual question was to be
decided by the judge, as mandated by state law, or by a jury, as permissible
under federal law. The Court discussed the issue in terms of outcomedetermination,77 but ultimately resolved it by identifying any competing state
and federal interests to be served and comparing their relative weights.
Concluding that the "federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact
questions was part of "the essential character or function of a federal
7
court,"
the Supreme Court held that the federal policy prevailed over the
relatively weaker state interest in this context.80
The difference between the York-Hanna and Byrd approaches is fundamental. The outcome-determination test derives from the two principles articulated
in Erie, which in turn derive from the competing state and federal interests that
characterize federalism problems generally and vertical choice-of-law problems
particularly. For the state, these interests include the integrity of its substantive
law (threatened by the substitution of alternative doctrine in the federal courts)

72. Id. at 109, 65 S. Ct. at 1470.
73. 380 U.S. 460, 85 S.Ct. 1136 (1965).
74. 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, cert. denied, 305 U.S. 637, 59 S. Ct. 108 (1938).
75. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 467, 85 S. Ct. at 1142.
76. 356 U.S. 525, 78 S. Ct. 893 (1958).
77. The resolution of the judge-jury problem under the outcome-determination test is
ambiguous. Compare id. at 536, 78 S. Ct. at 900 with id. at 539-40, 78 S.Ct. at 901-02.
78. Id. at 538, 78 S.Ct. at 901.
79. Id. at 539, 78 S.Ct. at 901.
80. See id. at 535-39. 78 S.Ct. at 899-902.
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and the integrity of its court system (threatened by forum-shopping). For the
federal government, the independence and supremacy of the federal courts are
at stake.
The Erie court understood the Rules of Decision Act to tilt in favor of state
interests in this context, and the York-Hanna outcome-determination test reflects
that a priori tilt. Thus, the test carries a state-interest bias into every case in
which it is applied. In contrast, Byrd bypasses the test and returns to the
fundamental federalism interest that animates vertical choice doctrine from
within. Byrd consequently represents an ad hoc balancing of those interests,
which happened to favor the federal side in the particular case.8
B. Levels of Abstraction
The preceding discussion suggests that the ad hoc approach encourages a
court to be inclusive in its consideration of the facts of the case. 82 Ad hoc
reasoning tends to be contextual because a broad sorting of relevant facts from
irrelevant facts-a fundamentally evaluative operation-requires an ordering of
the applicable values. The a prioriapproach, which provides such a sorting at
the outset, permits an early exclusion of many facts from consideration; this early
sorting pushes the subsequent analysis toward relative abstraction. In contrast,
the ad hoc approach postpones value ranking and thus provides less initial
guidance as to the relevance of particular facts.8"
This contrast is illustrated by traditional equal protection doctrine. The socalled "rational relationship" test, which requires that classifications of persons
employed by the government be rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose, 84 mediates the various values that come together in equal protection
issues. These values include the instrumental values pertaining to the carrying
out of the government's police powers: government must be able to govern, and
governing requires the use of classifications. (Try to imagine governmental
action that does not treat groups differently.) At the same time, equal protection
doctrine reflects Kantian values that require equal respect for all individuals; that

81. For other instances of this approach in the lower federal courts, see, e.g., Masino v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 652 F.2d 330 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S. Ct. 601 (1981);
lovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949, 80 S. Ct. 860 (1960).
82. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
83. This section treats contextuality as a metaethical position, i.e., as a particular attitude toward
the multiplicity of values that bear on doctrinal problems. But contextuality in legal reasoning can
reflect an ethical stance. We saw this in Part One in the discussion of the three models of ORPP.
The focus in the second model on the specific situation and characteristics of the actor, arises from
a preoccupation with free will and the moral evaluation of human conduct in terms of the goodness
of will. This contextual approach contrasts with that of the other models, which in turn represent
different moral visions.
84. E.g., McGlaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184. 191, 85 S. Ct. 283, 288 (1964). See generally
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341
(1949).
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is to say, individuals whose situations cannot in principle be distinguished should
be treated the same by government, and government should never use an
individual merely as an instrument to achieve some social end. 85
In hard cases, these instrumentalist and Kantian values will clash. How this
clash will be treated depends on how the rational-relationship test is applied. In
cases involving challenges to state laws regulating business, the Supreme Court
has generally applied the test in a highly abstract and hypothetical form. For
instance, McGowan v. Maryland involved an equal protection attack on
Maryland's Sunday closing laws, which exempted certain businesses.8 7 In
upholding the legislation, a unanimous Court explained that,
the Court has held that the 14th Amendment permits the States a wide
scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of
citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination
will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it....
It would seem that a legislature could reasonably find that the
Sunday sale of the exempted commodities was necessary either for the
health of the populace or for enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the day....
The record is barren of any indication that this apparently reasonable basis does not exist, that the statutory distinctions are invidious,
that the local tradition and custom might not rationally call for this
88
legislative treatment.
The Court's analytical task was to determine whether the exemptions
contained in the challenged enactment were rationally related to a legitimate
purpose. This inquiry could have been carried out contextually by trying to
ascertain why the Maryland legislature actually enacted this statute, what
relationship the legislature imagined to exist between this purpose and the
classifications they used, and whether that relationship could be factually
verified. Instead, the Court engaged in an almost wholly hypothetical examination. The legislature was "presumed to have acted within [its] constitutional

85. This anti-utilitarian dimension of equal protection is developed in Ronald Dworkin's
treatment of reverse discrimination. Ronald Dworkin. Reverse Discrimination. in Ronald Dworkin.
Taking Rights Seriously 223 (1977).
86. 366 U.S. 420, 81 S. Ct. 1101 (1961).
87. The exempted businesses included those involving "the retail sale of tobacco products.
confectioneries, milk, bread, fruits, gasoline, oils, greases, drugs and medicines, and newspapers and
periodicals." Id. at 422-23, 81 S. Ct. at 1103-05.
88. Id. at 425-26, 81 S. Ct. at 1104-05.
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power"; the statute would be upheld "if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it"; rather than ask what findings the legislature actually
made, the Court speculated as to what "a legislature could reasonably find"; and
instead of insisting that the record contain facts justifying the classification, the
Court presumed the statute valid in light of a record "barren of any indication
that this apparently reasonable basis does not exist."9
The alternative approach appears in cases like United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,'° in which plaintiffs challenged a provision of the
federal Food Stamp Act that denied assistance to households that included any
member who was unrelated to the other members of the household. After
announcing the applicability of the traditional, rational-relationship test, the Court
looked to the text of the statute to determine the proffered congressional purpose
behind the Food Stamp Act as a whole. The Court found these purposes-strengthening the agricultural and food economies and alleviating hunger and
t
malnutrition 9 -unrelated
to the statutory classification under attack. The Court
then turned to the purpose of the particular section in question, as justified in the
House Conference Report and in the congressional debate over the provision:
preventing "'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food
'
stamp program."92
The Court judged this particular purpose illegitimate.93
Finally, the majority considered the government's argument that the challenged
provision was designed to prevent fraud. After expressing doubt, in light of the
statute as a whole, over whether the provision was, in fact, designed to address
fraud, the Court concluded that the exclusion of households with unrelated
members was, in any event, not rationally related to that purpose.94
What characterizes the Moreno Court's approach is a relatively contextual
and adhoc application of the traditional equal protection test. The key questions
concerning purpose and the relationship between that purpose and the challenged
classification were answered in terms of the facts of the case. The Court wanted
to know what were the actual purposes of the Food Stamp Act and the exclusion
provision and what was the actual relationship between the two.
By contrast, the McGowan Court was content to speculate as to purpose and
relationship. This was justified in terms of a presumption of constitutionality-an a prioriranking of the instrumental, government-supporting values over
the Kantian, individual-supporting values-that informed the Court's understanding of the rational-relationship test. McGowan thus illustrates how apriority can
drastically constrict the range of relevant actual facts and thereby generate an

89.
90.

Id. at 426, 81 S.Ct. at 1105.
413 U.S. 528, 93 S.Ct. 2821 (1973).

91.

7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988).

92. 413 U.S. at 534, 93 S.Ct. at 2826 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 Cong.
Rec. 44439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).
93. Id. at 534-35, 93 S.Ct. at 2825-26.
94. Id. at 535-38, 93 S.Ct. at 2826-27.
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acontextual, abstract, and (in its more extreme form) largely hypothetical
analysis.
The Moreno Court's ad hoc reasoning avoided any such presumption of
constitutionality. Accordingly, both the instrumental and Kantian values relevant
to all equal protection issues were taken seriously by the Moreno Court's
contextual approach.
C. Anological Reasoning and the Problem of Characterization
I have so far considered how the choice between a priori and ad hoc
approaches to value conflicts in the law affects, on the one hand, the articulation
of legal doctrine, and on the other hand, the universe of facts regarded as
analytically relevant in a particular case. I will now address the tool that
mediates between doctrine and facts: analogical reasoning. Through analogical
reasoning, the judge drives toward a resolution of the dispute by comparing the
facts of the case sub judice to the facts of the prior cases out of which the
applicable doctrine arises.
Analogical reasoning reflects two different normative values.
One,
expressed by the phrase stare decisis, is a value which supports order and
stability in our understanding and application of the law. The other, expressed
by the doctrine of precedent, is an equality value that requires the law to treat
similarly situated people similarly.9
The judge's choice between a priori and ad hoc approaches to value
conflicts in the law directly bears on the force of precedent. Of course, the very
notion of binding precedent is dependent on a degree of apriority. This is clearly
true in hard cases. Whether the instant case is analogous to or distinguishable
from a prior case depends on whether the similarities or differences between the
cases are more relevant. But, as we saw in the preceding section, questions of
relevance depend on value choices. To the extent that the choice among
conflicting values is up for grabs (the ad hoc approach), then prior decisions are
relevant as voices from the community's past (declaring how the community

95. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
Debates about the scope of precedent follow familiar patterns. The debate is ostensibly about
whether the facts of the instant case are "similar" to those of the prior case. Of course, as has been
often observed, all cases are factually different in some respects. Thus, this particular debate is about
whether the differences between the instant and prior cases are significant in light of the values that
inform the relevant legal doctrine.
A second type of debate occurs when the parties agree that the precedent does not quite reach the
present case. In these instances, the arguments proceed in terms of whether the reasoning of the prior
case should be "extended" to the facts of the instant case (thereby consciously expanding the
understanding of "similarity") or "limited" to its own facts. Yet a third variation casts the debate in
terms of whether the prior case should be "followed" at all or instead "overruled."
These last two kinds of debate are also about the moral significance of the differences between the
two cases. Additionally, they concern the degree of stability we want in the law at the expense of
other values.
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resolved the conflict at earlier times), but not as commands (binding in the
present).
These observations can help us understand why the "gravitational force" of
precedent" ebbs and flows among different categories of cases. For instance,
precedent tends generally to have a greater impact in private law litigation than
in public law actions. Accordingly, we find more emphasis on apriority in
private law.
We see this, for instance, with respect to the competing models of ORPP.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts-addressing the normative principles
governing our private relationships-makes an a priori choice among the
models, 97 while the Model Penal Code-addressing the public relationship
between the individual and the state-leaves the choice largely to the decisionmaker on an ad hoc basis." Accordingly, the decisions following the Restatement will apply analogously to a wider range of cases than those following the
principles of the Model Penal Code.
This all makes sense in light of the values associated with the a priori and
ad hoc approaches. Order and stability, uniformity and predictability, are
significant in those matters governed by private law doctrine. In our voluminous dealings with other members of our community, we require a substantial
degree of normative clarity and predictability. We need to know what is
expected of us. Because legal principles help shape the normative structure of
our everyday lives, we "have a right to expect a regularity and rhythm from the
law." 99 Apriority serves these values by fixing the hierarchy of multiple values.
That is not to say that order is not important in public law matters. Surely,
the relationships between the individual and the government, between the state
and federal governments, and among the branches of government require a
significant dose of predictability, certainty, and uniformity. And yet judges°
frequently perceive a fragility about these relationships-a "delicate balance"'0
that must be struck. Protection of this delicate balance requires a sensitivity to
the competing values or policies or interests-however they are articulated. It
means trying to resolve disputes in terms of what will both resolve the particular
matter and still preserve the relationships. Least important (but not wholly
unimportant) is the effect that the resolution will have on the next case.
An extreme illustration of this juggling act is Eleventh Amendment
doctrine. 0 1 In a priori terms, this field of constitutional law makes no sense.

96. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 110-15
(1977).
97. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 cmts. b-c (1965).
98. See Model Penal Code § 2.02 (2)(d) (Official Draft 1962); Model Penal Code and
Commentaries, cmt. to § 2.02 at 242 (1980).
99. Aaron D. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Pennsylvania
Method, 9 Duq. L. Rev. 373, 382 (1971).
100. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445, 83 S. Ct. 822, 852 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
101. U.S. Const. amend. Xl:
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the amendment. to mean the
opposite of what it literally says,'0 2 and the Court has repeatedly reached
seemingly inconsistent results based on distinctions that cannot withstand even

the most casual scrutiny.'0 3

In short, it is impossible to synthesize
these
4

precedents into a coherent and consistent set of rules or principles.'0
But from another perspective, the Eleventh Amendment cases do make
sense. It is possible to discern in each majority opinion a careful groping for a
balance between the equally legitimate, competing assertions of federal and state
power-an ad hoc balance appropriate for the particular case. Hence, factual
distinctions among cases that defy principled explanation may very well have a
practical significance to someone attuned to their delicate political resonances.

Indeed, while creating this analytical mess during the past century, the Court has
juggled-arguably with considerable success-the state's interest in protecting
its sovereignty from the encroachment of federal courts with the national interest
in protecting the federal rights of individuals from violation by the states.
The public law cases I have been considering demonstrate how apriority
determines the controlling significance of precedent. Indeed, without an a priori
ordering of values, it is often difficult to understand just what a prior case stands
for. Accordingly, by emphasizing different values, a judge can transform the

very meaning of precedents.
Consider a particularly famous example of this transformation of precedents:
The facts of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.' 05 arguably fell within the scope
of precedents whose outcomes were animated by the contract principle that a
manufacturer is not generally liable for injuries caused to a remote purchaser by

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
102. E.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 107 S. Ct. 2941
(1987) (Congress has power to abrogate an amendment's protection); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000, 94 S. Ct. 2414 (1974) (amendment prohibits
retrospective legal relief, but permits prospective equitable relief); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 79 S. Ct. 785 (1959) (state may consent to suit in federal court); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504 (1890) (amendment prohibits suit in federal court against a state
by a citizen of that state).
103. E.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978) (suit
against state prohibited, but suit against political subdivision of the state permitted); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, reh'g denied, 416 U.S. 1000, 94 S. Ct. 2414 (1974) (damage
relief requiring retrospective payment of money to plaintiffs prohibited, but injunctive relief requiring
prospective payment of money to plaintiffs permitted); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441
(1908) (suits against state for injunctive relief prohibited, but suit against state officer for same
injunctive relief permitted).
104. This is not just my opinion. At least four members of the Court have argued this position
in recent years and have consistently called for afundamental rethinking of this whole doctrinal area.
E.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 509-11, 107 S. Ct. 2941.
2964-66 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234. 258-302,
105 S.Ct. 3142, 3155-78, reh'g dentied, 473 U.S. 926, 106 S. Ct. 18 (1985) (Brennan. J., dissenting).
105. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1916).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

a defective product. By reinterpreting these cases in light of tort principles
which make manufacturers liable for injuries proximately caused by their
defective products, Cardozo was able to factually distinguish them from the case
subjudice and hold Buick liable for the injury suffered by MacPherson, a remote
purchaser.t'6
Cases like MacPherson result from the courts' openness to ad hoc reordering
of competing values. Conversely, the more a court analyzes precedents in terms
of a pre-established, fixed hierarchy of values, the less fluid and manipulable the
meaning and scope of those precedents will appear. Their reach will be defined
in terms of a single, preeminent value, rather than in terms of distinct, coequal,
and competing values.
These considerations can also help us understand that critical moment in
legal analysis when the decision-maker classifies the problem. For example, in
Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll,'0 7 an employee of the Alabama Great
Southern Railroad was injured in Mississippi as the result of the negligence of
a co-worker. The substantive issue in the case-whether plaintiff had a cause
of action against the railroad-turned on whether the dispute was categorized as
a tort problem or one concerning the obligations of the employment contract.
Classification mattered because of the choice-of-law implications. If the dispute
had been characterized as a contract problem, the court would have applied
Alabama law under the traditional "place of contracting" rule and may well have
held that Alabama's employers' liability act (which permitted such suits against
employers) was an implied term of every employment contract made in the state.
By categorizing the case as one sounding in tort, the court applied Mississippi
law under the traditional "place of the wrong" rule and followed Mississippi's
common law doctrine immunizing employers from liability for injuries caused
by fellow servants." 8
Doctrinal areas are ostensibly distinguished along factual lines. Thus,
contract law is said to deal with disputes related to promises." 9 Tort law, by
contrast, is said to concern injuries that are not promissory in origin."' But,
as Carroll illustrates, a particular factual situation may involve a dispute with a
promissory or non-promissory base, depending on how one looks at it-more
precisely, depending on which facts one chooses to emphasize.
Hence, the process of classification is one particular form of the more
general process of analogical reasoning, which is to say, one particular form of
the process by which we decide the relative significance of particular facts.
Accordingly, which facts the court emphasizes in a case like Carroll will depend
on which values the court emphasizes. An emphasis on fault will focus attention
on the injury-causing conduct and make this dispute seem like a tort case while

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1051-53.
11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
Id. at 807-09.
See, e.g., John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § I-I (2d ed. 1977).
See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 14, §1.
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an emphasis on promise-keeping will focus attention on the agreement between
the employer and employee and make the dispute seem like a contract case.
In most disputes (as in Carroll), classification takes place rhetorically on the
level of factual analysis with no reference to the underlying values. In others,
the utter novelty of the facts forces the decision-maker to confront the value
choices driving the categorization process. This is typically true in cases
involving new technology, such as Baby M."' In that case, a woman had
agreed to be artificially inseminated, to bear the child, to give custody of the
child to the natural father, to permit the father's wife to adopt the child, and to
waive all parental rights. Before the agreement was finally executed, the
"surrogate mother" decided she wanted to keep the child. To "apply the law,"
the court had to decide what kind of law applied. But the dispute could easily
be categorized as a contract case, a custody case, or an adoption case. And the
different categorizations would have suggested different results or, at least,
different considerations and emphases on the way to obtaining the result. The
very process of deciding the classification issue drove the courts and commentators to confront the dramatic value issues raised by the new fertility technology. 2 Thus, disputes that present difficult questions of classification, like other
types of hard cases, involve values in conflict. Different values require emphasis
on different facts and pull the case into different classifications.
As with all difficult problems of analogical reasoning, the degree of apriority
that the decision-maker brings to these value conflicts profoundly affects the
process. A high degree of apriority proportionately fixes the reach of precedent
and thereby proportionately fixes the boundaries between categories. Conversely,
a low degree of apriority-an ad hoc approach to value conflicts-lays bare
those conflicts without providing the predetermined hierarchy to resolve them.

11.
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
112. See, e.g., Barbara L. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Wilfredo Caraballo, Baby M: A Non-Contract Contract Case,
18 Seton Hall L. Rev. 855 (1988); Janet L. Dolgin, Status arid Contract in Surrogate Motherhood:
An Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 515 (1990); Rene R. Gilliam, When a
Surrogate Mother Breaks a Promise: The Inappropriateness ofthe Traditional "'BestInterests ofthe
Child" Standard, 18 Mem. St. U.L. Rev. 514 (1988); Barbara K. Kopytoff, Surrogate Motherhood:
Questions of Law anid Values, 22 U.S.F.L. Rev. 205 (1988); Brian J. Carney, Note, Where Do the,
Children Go?-Surrogate Mother Contracts and the Best Interests of the Child, 22 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 1187 (1988); cf John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos. 76
Va. L. Rev. 437 (1990); Wendy D. Bowie, Comment, Multiplication and Division-New Math for
the Courts: New Reproductive Technologies Create Potential Legal Time Bombs, 95 Dick. L. Rev.
155 (1990) (legal status of frozen embryos); John M. Aragona, Comment, Dangerous Relations:
Doctors and Extracorporeal Embryos, The Need for New Limits to Medical Inquiry, 7 J. Contemp.
Health L. & Pol'y 307 (1991) (effect of in vitro fertilization technology on physicians' standard of
care); William J. Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and Parental
Rights: The Natural Endowmnent Critique, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1(1990) (application of contract
law to new reproductive technologies). Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) with
Surrogate Parenting Assoc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
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Paradoxically, by increasing the number of hard classification problems, the
ad hoc approach diminishes the importance of classification. Ultimately, what
is at stake is the resolution of value conflicts. Doctrine is an analytical tool that
is used to accomplish this, but if we can move straight to the values at stake and
choose a resolution, it matters little how we label that resolution.

If, as I have insisted in this Part, the basic analytical processes of identifying, articulating, and applying legal doctrine are driven by the general approach
toward multiple and irreconcilable values in the law-why is this question of the
proper approach not overtly discussed in legal arguments and decisions? Except
for instances like those discussed in Section A, when courts articulate doctrine
in terms of the underlying values, these issues are largely absent from the
rhetoric of legal analysis.
Some have argued that the effect of our rights-based legal rhetoric is to
obscure the value issues at stake.' 3 My attitude about this used to be the
sanguine belief that the traditional rhetoric of law did not hide moral debate;
rather, it4 constituted the vocabulary with which lawyers carried on moral
debate.'"
But surely the rules and tests and abstractions and analogies and distinctions
of legal argument do obscure values. What must be added, however, is that this
rhetorical avoidance of value conflicts is, itself, a moral stance-one that I have
leadenly labeled "apriority." If we come to legal analysis having already
resolved value conflicts in the abstract, there is no apparent need to address those
conflicts in the particular. Indeed, the very values served by apriority-uniformity, stability, efficiency, consensus-may well demand that we not rehash the
value issues. What must be remembered is that uniformity and stability and
efficiency and consensus are, themselves, values. And for those who prize them,
the "neutral" language of the law serves a socially vital function.

113. Consider, for example, Jane Baron's assertion: "Morality gets subsumed in, swallowed by,
craft; in using our accustomed vocabulary, we lose sight of what we are talking about." Jane B.
Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Rights-Talk, 33 Vill. L. Rev. 335, 365 (1988). See also Joseph W.
Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis.
L. Rev. 975, 1059:
The logic ofhuman rights is ahuman invention whose purpose is to preserve us from the
notion that we must make political and moral choices. To make conscious choices, it is
necessary to realize that we are making a choice. To choose wisely, we must know who
gains and who loses from the concrete legal rules and what values are thereby preserved
or undermined. Once we know everything that is involved in the decision, and we have
not arbitrarily constricted the alternatives available to us. then we make a choice. Those
decisions may be difficult and they may be painful, but making choices is what human
beings do.
114. Baron & Greenstein, supra note 113, at 363-64.
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CONCLUSION

Values clash in our moral lives. We define ourselves by the choices we
make. How we act in the face of moral dilemmas and which values we exalt
above others mark our individuality and say who we are.
The same holds true for communities. The community must resolve disputes
among its members; it must decide hard cases; it must determine how to deploy
its coercive force when fundamental values collide. And the choices-many of
which are made by courts-define the community's moral self.
But these choices encompass not just the final resolutions in hard cases, but
the style with which the resolutions are reached. As individuals and communities, we can confront the irreconcilable values directly, concretely, and
contextually in each and every case. In so doing, we show our respect for all
values; we engage in dialogue with both our present and past community; and
we make our choices in humility as we acknowledge the necessarily provisional
character of those choices.
But while we thereby gain respectfulness; dialogue, and humility, we subvert
predictability, stability, efficiency, and the foundation for a strong theory of
rights."' We risk losing that "regularity and rhythm" in the law.
As individuals and communities, we can instead fix our values in abstract
and hierarchical terms and create rules to define our obligations accordingly. We
thereby gain order, predictability, and the particular kind of moral integrity that
comes from judging people according to a consistent ranking of principles.
The danger of this way lies in forgetfulness. We may forget that the origin
of our choices among incommensurable values is community consensus or the
preferences of individual judges, and we may forget that the ultimate justifications for a fixed hierarchy among values-whatever it may be-are efficiency,
stability, and the individualism expressed in the idea of rights. We may forget
and come to believe that our choices represent the way things really ought to
be-indeed, the way things really have to be and that people who disagree with
our choices are not just different, but wrong. In short, we may forget the virtue
of respectfulness, dialogue, and humility.
These are not trivial matters. For as individuals and communities, we define
ourselves by what we choose and also by how we choose. When we presume
to instruct Walter and Bernice Williams on how an ordinary, reasonable, and
prudent person behaves, we meet up with the three faces of ORPP, each
expressing its unique personality and seeing the world with a unique moral
vision. Our first decision must be whether to look at those faces and acknowledge each of the personalities as our own.
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See supra note 38.

